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Dissatisfactionwith our ability to achieve reasonable compromises
between competing national objectives has reached crisis propor-
tion in recent years as, in country after country, a high rate of infla-
tion has continued to exist side by side with below-potential eco-
nomic growth and an unacceptably high rate of unemployment. In
such a climate, the clamor for direct government intervention to
influence wage and price decisions tends-to be strong. The United
States, England, France, Australia have found it necessary or con-
venient to resort to some kind of incomes policy or wage and price
controls to alleviate inflationary pressures.
The U.S. experimentation with wage and price policy in peace-
time goes back to the Kennedy-Johnson guideposts of 1962—1966,
although formal wage and price restraint was implemented only
241with the inauguration of the Economic Stabilization Program I. THØ
(ESP) by the Nixon administration in August 1971. The forces that PRI
broughtabout the new program were varied and complex, includ-
ing primarily the deterioration in the U.S. balance of trade and pay- O
ments, the repeated runs on the U.S. dollar in foreign money mar- Pr:
kets, and the failure of prices and wages to respond quickly and an1
adequately to the anti-inflationary demand-management policies of
the 1969—1971 period.
A cursory look at the record during the controls period shows Pu
moderate price increases in 1972 but sharply rising prices in 1973. ai
Do these diverse price trends reflect the relative success or failure th
of the various phases of the ESP, or are they largely the result of th
external market forces that overwhelm any impact emanating from th
wage and price controls? What are the theoretical considerations in ci
assessing the effectiveness of the regulations on the pricing prac- 1
ticesof different types of firms? Given these theoretical cons idera-
tions, how can we estimate the effects on prices and wages of the
various phases of the control program, and what degree of disag- Price
gregationis required to provide meaningftul results? In cases where T
wages and prices were found to have been significantly affected by ti
the control program, was this achieved at considerable costs in si
terms of market distortions?
Our purpose in this paper is to provide answers to some of these ti
questions, using phases 1,11, and III ofESP as a frame of reference.
The focus is on the manufacturing sector of the economy, on which gil
the program was supposed to have had its heaviest impact. The
paper contains two main parts, one theoretical and the other em-
pirical. In the theoretical section we explore the possible effective-
ness of the regulations on firms with different pricing practices. In ir
the empirical section we present the results of an integrated wage- au
price model focused on the manufacturing sector. The model con-
tains wage, price, and profit margin equations for seventeen rnanu-
facturing industries. These are aggregated on a fixed weight basis Phase
to create aggregate equations for manufacturing. Dummy variables 0
are used to capture specific structural shifts that may have occurred p
during the various phases of controls. One dummy variable, cover- p4
ing the eight-quarter period, is used for th.e wage equations, and n.
two dummy variables are used in the price equation to capture the lii
separate impacts of phases II and III. Dynamic simulations are jr
then used to compare the aggregate performance of the manufac-
turing sector with what would have occurred without price el
controls. re
242 Al-Samarrie, Kraft, and Robertsm THE THEORETICAL EFFECTIVENESS OF
at PRICE AND WAGE CONTROLS
Ourpurpose in this section is to explore the implications of the
Y price, wage, and profit regulations of phases I, II, and III. We ex-
r- amine the price regulations of the three phases for manufacturing
firms from the partial equilibrium viewpoint of the theory of the
of firm. While this is far from a complete picture of the effect of the
price regulations, it is a natural first step. In order for there to be
any aggregate effects in a dynamic general equilibrium context,
3. there must be some effect at the microeconomic or firm level. Fur-
re ther, the theoretical development offers a number of suggestions
of that can be combined with econometric analysis of past price
m changes and with data gathered by the price control agencies to
in produce tentative conclusions.
prices
re To facilitate the theoretical analysis of the effect of the price regula-
by tions on the determination of prices, assume that the firm faces a
in stable, downward-sloping demand curve' and makes a decision at
the beginning of each phase of controls that determines the quan-
se tity of all inputs hired, the prices of all outputs, and the quantity
• e. that will be produced over the period. In other words, at the be-
di ginning of each phase the firm chooses inputs, outputs, and prices,
he and these remain fixed over the period of the regulations. Further,
rfl the plan for prices, inputs, and outputs is independent of future
periods. The firm bases its decision on certainty expectations about
In input prices and demand (i.e., the variance of expected input prices
and.quantities sold at various output prices is zero).
-(U-
is Phase I
es On August 15, 1971, President Nixon announced a New Economic
ed Policy commencing with a freeze on most wages and prices for a
period of not more than ninety days.2 Many firms had either an-
• nd nounced price increases or planned price increases that were de-
he layed by the freeze.3 To the extent that these price increases were
ire in response to cost increases already incurred, the profitability of
ac- the firm would have been adversely affected during Phase I. The
ice effect on production decisions would, however, depend upon the
relation between demand and marginal costs. If some unit costs had
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prices, then clearly average costswould be higher. However, the
111
effecton marginal costs, in both the short and long run, is ambigu-
ous:marginal costs could either rise or fall for specific levels of
flu
output (see Truett and Roberts 1973). It seems likely, however, that
marginal costs would be higher. With prices frozen at prefreeze
levels, the firm would face a kinked demand schedule, with the
kink at the frozen price level. Thus, marginal costs could increase h
without the firm changing its output. The degree to which marginal
costs could change without having an effect on output would de-
pend upon the elasticity of the firm's demand curve and, hence, the
extent of discontinuity in the marginal revenue function. Thus,
there is some theoretical support for the hypothesis that the freeze dl
caused no change in output or prices relative to prefreeze levels,
that price increases should have been near zero, and that profit mar-
gins should have been somewhat below what they would have c
been without the freeze. a
0
PhaseII
Phase II price regulations classified firms into three tiers: Tier I—
firms with over $100 million in annual sales; Tier Il—firms with
between $50 million and $100 million in annual sales; and Tier
Ill—firms with less than $50 million in annual sales. Tier I firms l3
were required to "prenotify" the Price Commission of price in- d
creases unless they had a term limit pricing agreement (TLP).4 The al
prenotification requirement meant, in effect, a delay of thirty days.5
Tier II firms were required only to postnotify the Price Commis-
sion. Tier III firms were required merely to keep appropriate rec-
ords for auditing and monitoring purposes. f
The basic regulations that applied to manufacturing firms stated
simply: fc
A manufacturing firm may charge a price in excess of the base price only r
to reflect increases in allowable costs that it incurred since the last price
increase in the item concerned, or that it incurred after January 1, 1971, W
whicheverwas later, and that it was continuing to incur, reduced to re- P
fleet productivity gains, and only to the extent that increased price does fe
not result in an increase in its profit margin over that which prevailed fcu
during the base period.6 11
From the beginning of Phase II, one major stumbling block in
this regulation was the meaning and measurement of productivity. ta
At first, the forecasted productivity rise used to offset the rise in gi
244 Al-Samarrie,Kraft,and Robertswage rates was calculated by each firm. The situation was entirely
unsatisfactory from the standpoint of the Price Commission be-
n- cause no uniform productivity measurement was used by Tier I
of firms (some used output per man-hour as a measure of productivity,
tat while others used total factor productivity) and because many firms
ze showed zero or unacceptably low productivity figures, either be-
cause of oversight, ignorance, or a deliberate policy of justifying
se higher price increases. To remedy the situation the Price Commis-
tal sion, beginning in April 1972, required that instead of using their
own estimates, firms should apply a set of productivity factors de-
veloped by the staff of the commission for most four-digit Standard
is, Industrial Classification (SIC) industries. The commission's pro-
ze ductivity factors were based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
Is, trends in output per man-hour for 1958—1969. In addition to using
these productivity estimates as offsets to allowable labor cost in-
ye creases, firms were also required to subtract from cost increases an
appropriate amount of reduced fixed costs due to increased volume
of output. However, the projected volume was solely up to the
firm, rarely challenged by the operations staff of the Price Com-
mission, and generally quite low.
Other steps were taken by the Price Commission to limit "al-
tb lowable" cost increases. Allowable labor cost increases resulting
ier from contracts signed after August 15, 1971, were limited to the Pay
fls Board standard of 5.5 percent plus 0.7 percent for fringe benefits.
in- Other limits were placed on discretionary cost increases (overhead
he and advertising) incurred to avoid the intent of the regulations.
55 For several reasons, the impact of the limitation on labor cost
is- increases was not very significant for manufacturing firms. First,
workers under expiring contracts accounted for no more than one-
fourth of the total labor force of major unions (those representing
• ed 1,000 workers or more) during 1972; since unionization accounted
for about two-thirds of production workers on manufacturing pay-
rolls and about two-fifths of all production workers on private non-
• agricultural payrolls, the relative importance of expiring contracts
'1 was much reduced. Second, during Phase II the Pay Board ap-
•e- provals averaged 5.5 percent for new wage agreements, 5.3 percent
es for deferred agreements in durable manufacturing, and 5.3 percent
ed for deferred agreements in nondurable manufacturing (Mitchell
1974).
Firms were constrained by two control policies, one on allowable
in costs and one on the base-period profit margin (generally referred
tY. to as the second line of defense). If the firm had only one product,
in granted "allowable" wage increases, and based its decision on an
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Lassumed gain in total productivity roughly equivalent to the pro- fi1
ductivity and volume offsets required under Phase II, the two cOn- at:
trol policies were reduced to one basic restriction—a constant th
profit margin limit: either the profit margin in effect just prior to
cost increases occurring after January 1, 1971, or the profit margin w
in the base period,7 whichever was lower.
The effect of such a regulation under the foregoing assumptions
will depend on the pricing practices of the firm. Accordingly, we 8
shallconsider three types of firm: the profit-maximizing firm, the w
sales-maximizing firm, and the target-return-pricing firm. In each m
case, the firm is assumed to produce only a single product.
The Profit-maximizing Firm A single-product firm that is constrained d
by a constant profit margin rule has a profit margin curve that is cd
parabolic to the average cost curve, reaching a minimum and being s
closest, in absolute terms, to the average cost curve at its minimum. ff
The profit-maximizing firm would not necessarily be constrained p
by the Price Commission rules. Specifically, it would not be af- r
fected if the marginal revenue curve cut the marginal cost curve at g
the point at which the desired price was less than the allowable
cost curve.8 The S
During Phase II it was often argued that the allowable cost rules p
provided an incentive for firms to incur higher costs. Generally, the th
argument ran as follows: since an x percent increase in unit costs n
(assuming such cost increases were not detectable by the Price dl
Commiss ion as discretionary) entitled the firm to an equivalent x
percent increase in price, margins would remain constant, but abso- di
lute profits would rise. There is clearly some merit to this argu- ul
ment, especially when such cost increases can be shown on the cc
books to be current but actually are productive expenditures to be ei
recouped later. However, the argument is only valid under a in
limited set of circumstances. in
First, suppose the firm considers cost expenditures that are
purely wasteful. The firm will have an incentive to incur such costs iu
if the allowable price under the constraints of a given profit margin
is at a point on the firm's demand curve that is inelastic.9 In such The Fii
cases, the profit-maximizing firm will allow costs to increase until ol
the allowable price is such that marginal revenue is zero. By letting g
average unit costs rise by x percent, the firm is entitled to an x per- ni
cent increase in price. If demand is inelastic, the quantity de- ra
manded will fall by less than x percent, providing the percent in- dl
crease in profit is precisely equal to the percent increase in reve- fli
nue.However, the regulations always cause the profit-maximizing ra
246 Al-Samarrie, Kraft, and Robertsfirm to produce as much or more than it otherwise would have and . ata price equal to or less than the uncontrolled price, even when
the firm expends monies on nonproductive but allowable costs.
The firm will, however, have no incentive to engage in purely
in wasteful expenditures when the allowable price is in an elastic
portion of the firm's demand schedule. In this case, there will be no
distortion of the optimal capital-labor relation, in contrast to typical
public utility regulation based upon rate of return on capital. As is
well known, rate-of-return regulation causes an excessive invest-
ment in capital (see Averch and Johnson 1962, Baumol and
Klevorick 1970, and Stein and Borts 1972).
If the unnecessary cost increases are allowable cost increases but
do generate some present-valued revenue, it then follows that the
is constrained profit-maximizing firm will let cost rise more than if
such expenditures generated no revenue.'0 Under such conditions,
the firm will reach an equilibrium in maximizing profits at some
I pointbetween unconstrained output and the point where marginal
f.. revenue is zero, depending upon how much additional revenue is
at generated per dollar of unnecessary cost increases.
le
The Sales-maximizing Firm The implied effectiveness of the control
program is much different for a firm that maximizes sales (revenues)
than for one that maximizes profits. A sales-maximizing firm earns
ts no pure economic profits, that is, revenue is maximized subject to
the condition that total revenue must be greater than or equal to
x total costs. Of course, accounting profits would be positive, since
they are, in part, returns to factors of production that are not meas-
ured in the accounting process. If all unmeasured costs in the ac-
counting sense are fixed, then the allowable price curve may lie
everywhere above the average total cost curve, intersect it once, or
a intersect the average total cost curve twice. For the sales-maximiz-
• ing firm, the price control strategy must either be ineffective or the
firm must be forced to operate at a loss, since by definition the firm
:s just covers average total cost.
n
h The Firm That Pursues Target Rate-of-Return PricingSince the work
•ii of Kaplan, Dirlam, and Lanzillotti (1958), pricing to achieve a tar-
g get rate of return on investment has become widely regarded as the
most prevalent short-run business pricing practice. Usually target
rate-of-return pricing is construed to mean that the price is set so
that if the firm produces at "normal" output (generally defined by
management as 70—80 percent of capacity), it will earn its target
g rate of return on investment (net worth plus long-term debt). If net
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:_ 1.worth and long-term debt are constant, then repricing in response
to increased unit costs of production isequivalent to maintaining p
a constantdollar profit per unit o output w ene rm is operating p
atits "normal" rate. Price adjustments that maintain a constant
r*
dollar profit at normal output are referred to as "dollar-for-dollar
pass-throughs" of cost increases, a rule in effect under Phase IV of
the ESP. Phase II regulations allowed an equal percent increase
in unit profits to be tacked onto cost increases.
If capital jnvestment is unchanged, the same dollar profits would
achieve the target rate of return. It follows, therefore, that if the
firm had no volume offset for fixed costs (either because all account- r
ing costs were variable or because the firm projected no change in
volume), then the allowable price increase permitted by the Price
Commission would be greater than the price increase desired by
the firm using target rate-of-return pricing. If the firm did experi- f
ence an increase in volume and had a volume deduction for al-
lowable increases in variable costs, then the permitted price in-
crease may be greater than, equal to, or less than the desired price
increase, depending upon the magnitude of the volume offset, the ag
increase in allowable costs, and the profit margin of the firm.u1
Sincethe volume offset was entirely up to the firm, it would seem
likely that the requested price increase was "greater than or equal t
to" rather than "less than" for the firm using target rate-of-return r
pricing. The firm would have no incentive to incur unnecessary f
costs unless its projected volume increase was too high. In that
case, if it did incur additional costs, the percent increase in profits
would be commensurate with both. Thus, if the volume projection
was too high (which is unlikely), unnecessary costs could be in-
curred to raise profits at the normal level of output to achieve the
target rate of return. This analysis does not consider current de- ii
mand conditions but, in general, the target rate-of-return rule is not 11
aprofit-maxirriizing rule of thumb.
To summarize the import of the foregoing analysis, the effect of
Phase II controls depended upon the specific conditions of the Phase•
market. It seems likely that in several industries there was no P
change in historical relationships among prices, output, and costs. ti
Furthermore, in cases where structural shifts can be identified ii
empirically, the analysis should offer an explanation.
Phaselil
Guided by its avowed policy of ridding the economy of the fetters of ,
wageand price controls, the Nixon administration took advantage of p
























the observed improvement on the inflationary front in late 1972.
Phase III, which lasted for nearly half a year, abolished both the
Price Commission and the Pay Board, dropped the prenotification
requirements in most sectors of the economy, maintained the
report-filing requirements for only the largest economic units,
exempted the rent sector from control, made the profit margin rule
much less stringent, and allowed considerable flexibility in the
standards.12 These steps gave Phase III the appearance of"a dash
back to the market" despite repeated references by various govern-
ment spokesmen to the ultimate use of the "stick in the closet" to
restrain undue wage and price increases. Assuming the manage-
ment of the firm interpreted the new steps as the death knell of coil-
trois, then the firm would resume historical pricing practices. Thus,
if any structural shift was identified for Phase II, it should disappear
for Phase III. -
Wages
Thefirst freeze, in August 1971, applied to virtually all wages and
salaries, including those with increases scheduled by contract to
take effect during the freeze. Initially the Cost of Living Council
ruled that wage increases scheduled to go into effect during the
freeze could not be paid retroactively after the freeze was over. This
was later overturned by the courts, and many wage increases were
paid retroactively after Phase II began. This fact has two principal
effects on the data. First, because of the bunching of these in-
creases, the data should show a bulge for the beginning of Phase II.
Second, the increase in the wage indexes will lag behind the actual
increase in labor costs in those cases where wage payments were
made retroactive to the freeze.
Phase II
Phase II regulations were comprehensive, although some excep-
tions were later made in the program for small units (those employ-
ing fewer than 60 workers) and for low-wage earners. Employee
units were classified into three categories: Category I firms, those
with 5,000 workers or more, were required to prenotify the Pay
Board of all wage increases regardless of whether they were above
or below the pay standard; Category II firms, employing 1,000 to
5,000 workers, were only required to submit quarterly reports to the
Pay Board about pay increases, the same as for Category I units; and
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to little or no control. A pay standard of 5.5 percent per year for
contracts negotiated or determined after November 14, 1971, was
set by the Pay Board. This standard was, however, allowed to go
higher (up to 7 percent) in those special cases where higher wage
increases were deemed necessary to promote faster productivity
growth, to correct a gross inequity in the relation between the pay
of one group of workers and another group with which the first
group had a well-established parity, toallow for legitimate fringe
benefits, or to honor contracts written prior to Phase II and sched-
uled to go into effect during the phase.
Phase III
The Phase III regulations generally de-emphasized wage regula-
tions apart from food, health care, and construction. Officially, the
regulations published on January 12, 1973, still contained the 5.5
percent standard, but latitude for exceptions was greatly increased.
With the primary emphasis on a self-administered control program,
the prenotification requirement of wage increases by large units
was removed.
Relevant to this paper is the potential effect of the Pay Board
regulations on wage determination. This effort is somewhat un-
clear, for the regulations may tend to decrease or increase the rate
of change in wages in specific industries depending upon pre-
vailing economic conditions. One of the consequences of the estab-
lishment of an incomes policy is to add bargaining strength to those
contracts with pay provisions closest to the control program's pay
standard. For example, in an industry where, without a Pay Board,
the increase in wage rates may have been held to 4 percent by man-
agement, the increase in wage rates, under a 5.5 percent pay
standard, would be higher with controls than without them. How-
ever, in industries where management would have offered, say,
8 percent without a standard, the rate of increase in wage rates
would probably be constrained by the existence of a wage control
program with a 5.5 percent standard. Thus, the institution of a
standard tends to shift the bargaining on the distribution of income
from the industry to the national level, With an incomes policy that
is "in the national interest," the role of the labor union is to follow
the "national interest" with respect to the overall goals of reducing
inflation, although the brunt of the anti-inflationary strategy should
fall on tougher price regulations, particularly as they apply to those
industries most able to absorb cost increases.





TheWage increases granted during Phase II were not significantly
different from the 5.5 pay standard (see Mitchell 1974 for a discus-
sion of this point). While this is revealing, it does not answer the
pertinent question of whether wage increases would have been
different without wage controls. Although no definitive answer can
be provided, wage equations with dummy variables can be em-
ployed roughly to assess the relative impacts of the wage regula-
tions on different industries.
fi.FORMS OF THE VARIOUS AGGREGATIVE EQUATIONS
Inthe preceding section, microanalysis at the firm level was used
to suggest the various effects a control program might have. How-
ever, because of aggregation and data gaps, it is difficult to derive
aggregative equations for major economic sectors or a specific
industry from the theory of the firm. At the more aggregative level,
itis necessary to resort to less rigorously derived theoretical
ts models if one is to make any attempt at quantifying determinants of
wages and prices and the effect that controls may have had.
Prices, profit margins, and wage rates are not only interrelated
but they depend on similar economic forces. For example, an in-
crease in the overall price index for goods and services usually
provokes an upward pressure on wages in various industries. In
addition, the relative rates of increase in prices and wages, together
with changes in demand and nonlabor unit cost, will largely deter-
mine whether the profit margins of specific industries will increase
or decrease. Moreover, both prices and profit margins are heavily
• affected by such things as the scale of production, the intensity of
demand, and the efficiency with which inputs are used in the pro-
duction processes. These interrelationships should be kept in mind
in setting the analytical framework and in interpreting and estimat-
ing equations relevant to the three variables.
a
at ThePrice Equations
W In theory, price changes are a function of changes in demand and
supply forces. Demand changes are caused by shifts in consumers'
incomes, consumers' tastes, and relative prices. Changes in supply,
se on the other hand, largely reflect changes in technology and input
prices, both of which affect productivity and unit costs. The manner








I—by which these demand and supply forces affect price adjustment
depends heavily on the relative sizes of supply and demand elas-
ticities. The latter, in turn, are a function of the degree of competi-
tion in commodity and labor markets,the degree of substitution
among inputs, the length of theproduction process, the reliability
and speed of information, and the institutional arrangements gov-
erning the production and distribution of goods and services.
A priori, one would expect large differences among manufactur-
ing industries in the wayin which supply and demand forces affect
their prices. Whether or not the responses of industry prices to
these forces can be adequately measured by use of regression equa-
tions is an open question. For one thing, most of the factors with a
bearing on member firms' pricing decisions lack available quan-
titative measures. And since these factors are continuously inter-
acting, no neat hypothesis exists that can be tested with available
data.
While theory and available data are so far apart in the case of
price adjustments that no meaningful tests can be performed, it is
still possible to use the correlation-regression approach to identify
stable relations among the prices of key manufacturing industries
(the object of the price restraint program) and other explanatory
variables which, at least to a degree, run the gamut of supply-
demand factors. The objective of such an approach is not so much to
test a theory of market behavior but to predict price changes. The
basic form used here is
(1)-=a0+a1---+a2-r+a3±'.+ 124— +a54•r. +a6!
where p is an index of the price of output, y is an output variable,
ydisan excess demand variable, w is a wage rate variable, v is an
index of materials prices, r is arate of return variable, and i is an
interest rate variable.
TheProfit Margin Equations
Profitmargins are, by definition, a function of output price, level of
output, and unit (r average) costs of production. Hence, equations
that explain changes in profit margins do not suffer from the same
theoretical morass of confluent unmeasurables as optimal price ad-
justment. They do, however, suffer from inadequate profit data.
Therefore, the parametric values we obtain in estimating an equa-
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----it Furthermore,where the standard error is sufficiently small, such
equations should also be useful in assessing the potential impact of
a system of price controls that relies, in part, upon profit margin
limitations.
y The equation for profit margins is
dm
_
dy dp dw dv di dk
()—— a0+a1—+ a2—+a3—+a4—+a,—+a6
where m is the ratio of pretax profits to sales, and k is a depreciation
rate variable. Other variables are defined in equation 1.
a
N The Wage Equations
e
The basic Phillips-curve hypothesis (which serves as an initial
point of departure for the specification of our wage equations)
states that when the supply of and demand for labor in terms of
money wages is not in equilibrium, the rate of change of wages is
proportional to the excess demand for labor. The relationship be-
tween money wage change and the unemployment rate is convex.
This is but one of several possible nonlinearities in the determina-
:o tion of the rate of change in money wages (for a discussion of non-
• .e linearities in wage equations, see de Menu 1969). This convex re-
lationship between the unemployment rate and the rate of change
in money wages is approximated by the inverse of the unemploy-
ment rate. Labor market tightness is characterized by extremely
large wage changes at low unemployment rates. The opposite is
true for a fluid labor market.'3
The relationship between prices and wage change can be estab-
n lished in two ways. First, wage bargaining is more in terms of real
wages than money wages, and thus money wages are influenced by
prices. Second, money wage determination is based on money
wage expectations as measured by future price expectations. In the
absence of a money illusion, individuals should fully anticipate
price changes and translate them into wage gains. This would im-
ply a vertical long-run Phillips curve and a coefficient of unity on
the expectations variable. In most empirical tests of the expecta-
e tions hypothesis the coefficient has been statistically less than
unity.'4 The real wage associated with any increase in money
wages' varies inversely with the rate of change in the prices workers
pay as consumers, and thus workers adjust their wage demands ac-
cording to the size of the price inflation they expect. A coefficient
StabilizationElfects on Wages, Prices, and Profit Margins 253of less than unity would imply that workers are either unwilling or
unable to translate the price increases into wage demands.
The effect of the wage regulations on econometric wage equa-
tions over the various phases of controls depends to some extent
upon how such equations are specified. In recent years, a number
of alternative hypotheses of wage determinations have been ad-
vanced, all of which apparently have approximately the same ex-
planatory ability.'5 However, the type of specification does affect
the significance of dummy variables included in an equation. This III.
isevident by comparing some recent studies of wage determination
at the aggregate level. Perry (1970) used a modified Phillips-curve
approach for wage determination by emphasizing labor market For
variablesthat differ from the conventional aggregate rate of civilian
unemployment. Using a weighted unemployment rate and an un-
employment dispersion index, Perry was able to track movements
in wages during the late 1960s that were above the rates predicted
by previous conventional models. Perry's approach yields a sig-
nificant guidepost dummy variable. Eckstein and Brinner (1972) ex-
plain the apparent outward shift in the Phillips curve by using an
inflation severity variable with the usual aggregate rate of unem-
ployment. This approach also yields a significant dummy variable
for the period of the guideposts. Gordon (1971, 1972) uses three
labor market variables along the lines of Perry's and rejects the
significance of a guidepost dummy variable. Wachter (1974) takes
into account the change in the relative structure of wages over the
business cycle, uses the conventional rate of unemployment, and
rejects the significance of a dummy variable.
Often profits or the profit rate are included in the wage equation
on the presumption that profits influence the bargaining power of
unions and management in the determination of wages. Kuh (1967), Esti however,argues that profits are actually a proxy for productivity,
and that workers bargain for higher wages on the basis of increased
•productivity and its associated reduction in unit labor costs. t
In summary, we hypothesize that the rate of change in money c
wage rates is a function of labor market tightness, priôe expecta—
tions, and labor productivity. The general form of the equation ti
estimated for each industry is as follows:
where w is the industry wage rate, p is the consumer price index, ei
E is the industry employment, Qisthe productivity index for all al
manufacturing, U is the aggregate rate of unemployment, Z is the (1
254 Al-Samarrie, Kraft, and Robertslevel of industry profits, L is the layoff rate for all manufacthring,
r and GPD is a guidepost dummy variable; its value for 19621 is 0.25;
for 196211, 0.50; 1962111, 0.75; 19621V—19661V, 1.0; 19671, 0.75;
196711, 0.50; 1967111, 0.25; and zero for all other quarters.
r
ill.DATA TECHNIQUES AND METHOD OF ESTIMATION
S
n
e Formof the Variables and the Data
Forseveral reasons, we elected to use the four-quarter percent
change in each variable, which we then corrected for autocorrela-
tion. All the rate variables were expressed in decimal as opposed
ci to percent form. All lags were introduced as either fixed weighted
averages of past variables (rather than being estimated freely) or
as lag adjustments. For the weighted average, weights of 0.4, 0.3,
0.2, and 0.1 were used for periods t through t —
The data used to estimate the price equations are at the two-
e digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) level of compilation.
•e The variables are largely self-explanatory except for the indexes of
output and input prices. All are defined in the appendix below. The
variables were constructed in a manner similar to that employed by
Eckstein and Wyss (1972).17 However, the final series were con-




Thewage, price, and profit margin equations were estimated for
the time interval from 1959111 to 197111. The initial date was
• chosen primarily because of data limitations, and the closing one
was selected so as to avoid the influence of the Economic Stabiliza-
tion Program.
The use of four-quarter rates of change reduces the multicolline-
arity among variables in a statistical sense, although it does not
eliminate the problem. In using four-quarter rates, we do not as-
sume that a constant fraction of the dependent variable changes
every quarter with the same parametric response to the same van-
11 ables (or the equivalent) as postulated, for example, by Perry
(1964). For a discussion of the problems generated by the Perry-
StabilizationEffects on Wages, Prices, and Profit Margins 255 IItype assumption, see Black and Kelegian (1972) or Rowley and
Wilton (1974).18
The estimated wage, price, and profit margin equations were cor-
rected for autocorrelation, using nonlinear least squares estimation
and the Hildreth-Lu technique.'9 The latter was used to search a
grid of values to insure a global minimum rather than only a local
minimum for the residual sum of squares. The wage equations were
corrected for first-order autocorrelation; and the price and profit
margin equations, for second-order autocorrelation. c
ft
IV.EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR 1959111-197111
Asummary of the results for the estimated price, profit margin, and
wage equations for the seventeen industries is presented in tables
1, 2, and 3. Initially, each equation was estimated with all the hy-
pothesized variables included. Variables were then retained in an
equation on the basis of two considerations: one, that the variable i
wassignificant prior to the correction for serial correlation; two,
that the variable also proved to be significant in other periods of
estimation and the estimated coefficients appeared to be robust
both prior to and after the correction for serial correlation. Variables
were retained in the estimated equations on this basis even if their ii
estimated coefficient was not significantly different from zero; van- a
ables that did not satisfy conditions one and two were dropped
from the estimated equations. Within any general category of van-
ables, such as output or demand, the specific forms of the variables
may differ, as indicated in the tables.
11
ThePrice Results
Aswould be expected, price changes are positively and signifi-. ti
cantly affected by wage and materials cost pass-throughs in most of H
the sample manufacturing industries. However, the results do not ti
provide clues to the market structures of specific industries. They h
are capable of supporting either a competitive pricing model or the d
other widely held hypothesis: target-rate full-cost pricing. At least
in part, this is because of the broad level of industry aggregation c
with which we are working (two-digit SIC) and because of the van- Si
ables chosen for making the analysis. Most of these variables enter
into the pricing decisions of both competitive and noncompetitive c:
256 Al-Samarrie, Kraft, and Robertsfirms. Variables such as capital costs that would be useful in dis-
criminating between competing theories are either not available in
accurate form or are rendered ineffective by the presence of more
powerful cost factors with which there may be strong multicol-
linearity.
The output variable has an impact on the dependent variable in
textiles (SIC 22), lumber (SIC 24), paper (SIC 26), and electrical
machinery (SIC 36). For textiles and lumber, the positive output
coefficient taken in conjunction with the positive association be-
tween the price variable and the profit margin (Table 2), implies
that price increases in those two industries tend to exceed average
cost increases when output is rising, with the result that consumers
do not always share in the fruits of cyclical increases in produc-
tivity. Or put another way, prices in those industries are responsive
to the market cyclical changes associated with those industries. For
paper and electrical machinery, the negative correlation between
changes in output and variations in price would suggest that those
industries pass on cost declines during periods of increasing pro-
ductivity. This phenomenon seemed to have characterized the
1959—1966 period when, because of increased capacity utilization,
the electrical machinery industry was able to maintain relative
price stability.
As an explanatory variable, excess demand seems to be important
in only four industries. In three of them (food processing, lumber,
and nonferrous metals), the regression coefficient has the correct
sign, i.e., there is a negative association between the inventory-to-
sales ratio (a proxy for excess demand) and the four-quarter rate of
change in output price. In chemicals and fabricated metals, prices
tend to fall when demand becomes excessive.
In only one instance is there a negative relation between changes
• in wages and changes in prices. Adjusted average hourly earnings
were not available for nonferrous metals (SIC 33). For this indus-
try, both unadjusted wage rates and wage rates adjusted for over-
• time and interindustry shifts were tried. The latter gave a superior
fit. A 1 percent increase in average hourly earnings, excluding over-
time, results in a decline of 0.77 percent in output prices, but in a
• lagged manner over sixteen quarters. The negative coefficient is
difficult to explain.
Materials prices are significant in eight industries. The negative
coefficients on input prices in textiles and rubber are extremely
small—0.01 and 0.04 percent, respectively.
r A decline in cash flow in tobacco is associated with price in-
creases. The four-quarter rate of change in Moody's Aaa bond rate

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.in tobacco is positively related to price movements aswell as cash The
flow. For other variables there is no signfficant relationship with
price changes in all the other industries.
TheProfit Margin Results
Thedemand and cost variables are much weaker in explaining the
variations in the profit margins of food processing (SIC 20),
apparel (SIC 23), furniture (SIC 25), and stone-clay-glass (SIC 32)
than those of ferrous metals (SIC 331), fabricated metals (SIC 34),
nonelectrical machinery (SIC 35), and instruments (SIC 38). The
explanation may lie in the degree of market power exercised by
different industries and in the ability and willingness of those in-
dustries to absorb cost increases. By and large, the first group of
industries is relatively competitive, operates with narrow margins,
and is often forced to absorb some cost increases when demand is
weak. The other group of industries, on the other hand, tends to
pass on to consumers the bulk of cost increases, irrespective of the
state of the business cycle.
Increased output raises profit margins in every industry except
food processing, where it is not significant, and transportation (371),
where we could not obtain a fit. And except for those industries,
the estimated elasticity of profit margins with respect to output is
greater than 1.00. For example, at a profit margin of 0.07, a 1 percent
increase in output in textiles would increase margins 2.5 percent, to
0.0718.
Price increases in food processing and chemicals are associated
with falling margins. This indicates that price increases do not fully
compensate for rising average costs. For example, it is well known
that when farm food prices are rising, processors do not mark up
and pass through all the increases. In the chemical industry, price
reductions are associated with increased margins, indicating that
while productivity gains do lower prices, the price reductions do
not match unit cost declines, with the result that margins increase.
The constant term is relatively large and negative for the ma-
jority of industries covered in this report. This is probably because
we have not estimated the precise profit margin identity: HIpx=
1—(WLIpx)—(rk/px).Instead we have abstracted from the identity
the main economic variables that influence profit margins.
264 Al-Samarrie, Kraft, and RobertsThe Wage Results
Forall industries except apparel, chemicals, and nonferrous metals,
a form of the rate of change in the consumer price index (CPI) is
significant at the 10 percent level. In tobacco and lumber, a 1 per-
cent increase in price induces an increase of more than 1 percent
in wages. The CPI is particularly important during periods of rapid
inflation when, in their desire to catch up, union leaders usually
have strong support among workers to push for higher wages. The
role of the CPI in wage determination has become much more im-
portant of late as labor contracts increasingly contain cost-of-living
escalator clauses, and as nonunion wages tend to follow union wage
patterns, though often with some lags.2°
Profits do not seem to be significant in explaining wage changes,
perhaps because of their high collinearity with consumer price
changes and with productivity. The role of productivity in wage
settlement seeths to be unimportant, except in such industries as
tobacco, primary metals, and motor vehicles. In these industries,
there is some information on productivity trends that can be con-
sidered along with other variables in determining hourly wage rate
increases, even though labor and management do not always agree
on the size aild measurement of productivity growth. Moreover, the
fact that there has been a significant application of labor-saving
technology in these relatively highly unionized and concentrated
industries makes consideration of the productivity variable highly
relevant in any meaningful wage negotiations.
Changes in production worker employment is another variable
that may have an impact on variations in the hourly wage rate. Dur-
ing periods when the labor market is relatively tight, an industry
that must expand its labor force in order to perform efficiently may
have to pay higher wages in order to attract workers from other
industries or discourage its existent workers from leaving in search
of more attractive pay. For several of the industries covered in this
paper, the coefficient on the employment variable has the expected
positive sign. However, the coefficient is negative for several other
industries—food, tobacco, ferrous metals, and electrical machinery.
In these industry groups, the trend of production worker employ-
ment has been downward, largely because of automation. The
negative sign can be explained by the existence of strong union
pressure for higher wages as a partial compensation for reduced
employment. This is true in electrical machinery, where a 1 percent
decrease in employment would increase average hourly earnings
by 0.10 percent.
StabilizationEffects on Wages, Prices, and Profit Margins 265In most cases, the measures of labor market tightness were in-
effective in explaining movements in wages. The aggregate un-
employment variable had the expected positive sign in textiles,
furniture, and ferrous metals, while layoffs had the expected nega-
tive sign in apparel, nonferrous metals, and transportation. It would
appear that national indicatorsof labor market tightness have
minimal impact in explaining the movement of wages on the dis-
aggregated two-digit manufacturing industries •21
Theguidepost dummy variable is significant and negative in
eleven industries, its impact ranging from 0.4 to 3.85 percentage
points 22
V. DIRECT IMPACT OF PHASES I,II, AND III
ON PRiCES, PROFIT MARGINS, AND WAGES
IN SEVENTEEN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
Inthis section of the paper we attempt to measure the direct impact
of the Economic Stabilization Program on the determination of
prices and wages in specific manufacturing industries. The direct
impact is to be distinguished from the total impact, which includes
feedbacks between prices and wages. The mechanism for measur-
ing the total impact will be discussed in section VI.
Obtaining the direct impact of controls is possible by re-estimat-
ing industry equations for 1959111—197311 so as to include the eight
quarters of the ESP. The dummy variable ESP1 was added to all
the wage equations and has the value of 1.0 in the eight quarters
from 1971111 to 197311, and zero in all other quarters. The price
and profit margin equations have two dummy variables: ESP2,
which equals 1.0 in the period 1971111—19721V, and zero other-
wise; and ESP3, which equals 1.0 in 19731 and 197311. The ap-
proach is analogous to the one used for the guidepost dummy
GPD.23
Using the estimated coefficient for a dummy variable in an equa-
tion for prices, wages, and profit margins leaves a great deal un-
answered about the program. First, it assumes that the program was
totally responsible for any change that occurred. Second, to deter-
mine the total impact, a model should be constructed that would
compare simulated values without controls to simulated values
with controls or with actual data where there exist interactions
between wages and prices.24 This exercise was far too complicated
and required too many questionable assumptions to be undertaken
266 Al-Samarrie, Kraft, and Robertshere. However, an aggregate model for the manufacturing economy
is presented in section VI.
The results of the re-estimated equations are shown in tables 4, 5,
and 6. In general, there was very little change in the value of the
coefficients for the independent variables or the general statistical
properties of the equations. The control dummies, ESP1, ESP2, and
ESP3, were retained regardless of their significance.
The listing in Table 7 highlights the cases in which the dummy
variables in the price, profit margin, and wage equations were sig-
nificant at the 5 or 10 percent level. A negative coefficient suggests
that controls may have been effective in restraining prices and
wages, and a positive coefficient would imply at least the absence
of restraint. Several inferences cau be drawn from this table and
from tables 4 through 6.
The control program seemed to be totally ineffective in con-
straining price inflationin those industries that experienced
demand-pull inflation during phases II and III, namely, lumber
(SIC 24), ferrous metals (SIC 331), and nonferrous metals (SIC 333).
The explanation lies, perhaps, in the nature of capacity utilization
• in these industries and in the manner in which wage and price
controls work during various phases of the business cycle. It is gen-
erally recognized that controls tend to be much more effective in
• restraining prices when there are significant amounts of unused
• capacity in various industries than during periods of capacity con-
straints. The experience of the lumber industry from the second
half of 1972 through most of 1973 reflected the influence of the
housing boom and the resulting pressure on lumber prices. Simi-
larly, the acceleration in general economic activity in this period
put undue pressure on productive capacity and prices within the
metals industry and made evasion of price controls by some Tier I
firms much easier.
Despite its attractiveness as a resource-saving device for the
Price Commission staff, term limit pricing (explained in note 4)
was a factor in the lack of any significant impact of the control
program on the pricing decisions of such key industriesas
chemicals (SIC 28) and electrical machinery (SIC 36). Many of
the companies that elected the TLP arrangement were in these
two industries, and their productivity growth during the 1971—
1972 business recovery was above average. This productivity
improvement, couled with the significantly high rate of profits,
should have resulted in more nioderate price performance by the
chemical and electrical machinery industries than what actually
occurred. It is conceivable that the TLP arrangement (which gave
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.TABLE 7 Two-Digit SIC Manufacturing Industries in Which





Positive Negative Positive Negative
Price Equation
SIC 24+ SIC 21* SIC 24+ SIC 23*
SIC 331*SIC 23+ SIC 26+ SIC 35f






SIC 26* SIC 22* SIC 28* SIC 25*
SIC 30+ SIC 331*SIC 26+
S1C331* S1C34*
Wage Equation
SIC 25* SIC 24*
SIC 32*
SIC 331*
companies much flexibility inraising individual prices so long as
their weighted average price increases were within the prescribed
limit of 1.8 percent) could have resulted in the circumvention of a
significant downward impact on prices that otherwise would have
been obtained because of the control program. Moreover, with the
relaxation of the control program under Phase III, and with the
significant reduction in the level of unused capacity experienced
during the first half of 1973, demand pressures asserted themselves,
thereby rendering unlikely any effective price restraint in these and
several other industries. Small wonder then that the coefficients on
the dummy variables turned out to be positive in the price
equations for several industries. Output prices in the tobacco
industry (SIC 21) and in apparel (SIC 23) were somewhat lower
under Phase II than would have been the case without controls.
The dummy variables for the wage equations, if significant, are
generally capturing shifts arising from other causes. Most of' the






*significant at 5 percent level,
I Significant at 10 percent level,
VI.major contracts in manufacturing were not negotiated during
phases I and II, having been signed prior to mid-1971. The only
industries in which the Pay Board played a major role during the
control period were lumber and glass. The Pay Board's action is
— reflectedin the negative coefficient on the wage dummy variable
e for SIC 24 (Table 7).ThePay Board's action is not reflected in a
similar wage constraint for SIC 32, which incorporates the glass
industry subgroup. This is because the wage behavior of the other
subgroups of SIC 32 (namely, stone and clay) was subject to little
F or no control due to the preponderance of small firms in these two.
F The positive coefficient for ferrous metals in the wage equation
is perhaps more indicative of the distortion hypothesis than the
effects of the control program. The wage settlement in this indus-
try was negotiated prior to the August 1971 freeze. It is interesting
that average hourly earnings in ferrous metals were "out of line"
by about 4.7 percent. However, an examination of the profit margin
equation seems to suggest that the advances in the wage variable
may have been more than compensated by price increases, since
the profit margin dummy variable is positive and significant for the
ferrous metals industry.
Finally, according to the equations, wages were held down in
lumber, while prices were pushed above their normal relation with
the independent variables, though without any impact uponthe
profit margins. This can perhaps be explained by the proposition
that large lumber firms used wage increases as a trigger to raise
prices, and that such wage increases are correlated positively with




VI.AGGREGATE WAGE-PRICE EQUATIONS AND
THETOTAL IMPACT OF CONTROLS
5, Microanalytic data and disaggregated industry equations are indis-
pensable to any meaningful understanding of the wage-price control
experiment. However, in most of the literature, the impact of con-
trols is assessed through the use of aggregate wage-price relations
for the manufacturing or private nonfarm sector of the economy.
er Following this practice, the seventeen industry variables were
aggregated into macroeconomic wage and price variables for total
re manufacturing. The purpose of this exercise was twofold: to deter-
mine if the aggregate results were consistent with the industry
StabilizationEffects on Wages, Prices, and Profit Margins 275
4'results and to ascertain the results of the program in terms of the
movement of macroeconomic variables.
The manufacturing wage and price equations were estimated for
the period 1959111—197111 to detennine the aggregate historical
relation, and simulated from 1971111 through 197311 to provide a
basis for assessing the movement of wages and prices in the ab-
sence of controls. The equations werethen re-estimated with
dummy variables from 1959111 through 1973111 to determine the
direct impact of controls on manufacturing input prices in phases II
and III. The model was then simulated over the control period to
allow for feedbacks between wages and prices, so that we could
measure the total impact of controls. The method of aggregation
entails weighting average hourly earnings, output prices, and input
prices for each of the seventeen manufacturing industries by the
appropriate relative value of shipments in 1958. The other variables
in the estimated wage and price equations were taken from data
relevant to the manufacturing sector.
Variables shown as four-quarter rates of change are marked by an
F suffix. Variables with the suffix FWA are defined as four-quarter
rates of change with an imposed weighted average of that variable
for periods tthrought— 3(see appendix). The wage and price
equations are estimated with the identical autocorrelation correc-
tion procedure that was used to estimate the industry wage and
price equations of section V.
EstimatedEquations
Theresults for the estimated wage and price equations appear in
Table 8. The estimated coefficients all have the correct signs and
the correct magnitudes. In the wage equation, the coefficient on the
price expectations variable (PFWA) is significantly different from
zero but not significantly different from unity, indicating that
workers attempt to recover loss of real income in the form of higher
money wages. The other two variables in the wage equation that
are significant at the 5 percent level are the wage guidepost dummy
variable (GP) and changes in output per man-hour in manufacturing The
(QFWA).The aggregate unemployment25 rate (a)hasthe correct
sign but is insignificant at the 5 percent level. Changes in prices
are explained by changes in labor and nonlabor input costs. In par-
ticular, standard unit labor costs (WFWA,_1 —0.03) andinput prices
(lPFWA) explain 94 percent of the movement of prices. A 1 percent
276 Al-Samarrie, Kraft, and Roberts
.1change in standard unit labor costs induces a change of 0.36 percent
in prices.
r For manufacturing wage and price equations to capture the feed-
backs of inflation, itis necessary to treat wages and prices as
a endogenous variables. While wages (WF) and output prices (PQF')
are endogenous to the model, consumer prices are exogenous. To
close the model, consumer prices (PF) are made a function of out-
put prices (PQF). The equation linking output prices and consumer
prices (PF) is estimated for the period 1959111—197111 by using an
) Almonlag. The estimated equation implies that the partial adjust-
ment mechanism will translate 95 percent of output prices into
input prices in eight quarters. The estimated linking equation is26
PF1=0.01161+0.95212PQF(—i)
(14.62)(21.21) =D
= 0.91; DW=0.412; SEE=0.00410
The simulations are based on the four-quarter price and wage equa-
tions, fitted to the period 1959111—197111 (equations 1 and 3 of
Table 8). Over the entire period, the full model has a tendency to
underpredict wages by 0.061 percentage points. The error meas-
ures provide the first warning that the model will not perform with
complete accuracy. While the estimated wage and price equations
have significant coefficients and strong explanatory power, the
structural equations when combined into a model fail to perform
with any real consistency. First, the model tends to slightly under-
predict wages. This problem is compounded by the failure of the
model to track the wage increases of the late 1960s.27 Second, the
root-mean-square errors for the wage and price simulations are
larger than the standard errors for the estimated wage and price
•i equations. This implies that the variances of the residuals of the
simulations are larger than the variances of the residuals of the esti-
mated equations. The interpretation of the mean absolute errors
• is that at each discrete simulation the average error, irrespective
of sign, is 0.5352 percentage points for wages and 0.3978 for prices.
TheWage-Price Control Program
Theactual movement of wages and prices during the control
period can be compared with the performance of the model in simu-
lations from 1971111 to 197311 under the influence of identical
exogenous factors. Comparisons are made on the basis of average
performance of controls for 1971111—197311, which corresponds























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1roughly to the period of the initial wage-price freeze, the controls
of Phase II and the more flexible controls of Phase III. The exog-
enous variables retain their actual values (historical values) for this
period, while the endogenous wage and price variables assume the tl
values of 197111 as their initial values and the simulated values
thereafter. By beginning the dynamic simulation in 1971111, we e1
avoid the cumulative underpredictions exhibited by the 1959111—
197111 simulation.
If wages and prices were determined in the same manner after
controls as in the period prior to 1971111, then our model would ac-
curately predict the movement of wages and prices during the con- f
trol period. If the mechanisms that generated wages and prices
prior to controls were operating in an unrestrained fashion during
the control period, then the errors generated in the latter period
should be of approximately the same magnitude as those before.
Table 9 contains the simulated wage and price changes predicted
for 1971111—197311. These results are characteristic of an economy
without controls, while the actual wages and prices are for an
economy with controls. The average difference between the simu-
lated and actual values could serve as a crude approximation for
the total impact of controls.28
Since this approach is unable to distinguish between simulation
error and error due to controls, the alternative—to estimate the di-
rect impact of controls by including dummy variables in the wage
and price equations—has also been used. The dummy variables
measure the influences on the residuals of an estimated equation.
We have associated these structural influences with the efforts of
the Economic Stabilization Program by defining ESP to coincide
with the establishment of wage and price controls.
Equations 2 and 4 of Table 8 were estimated for 1959111—197311.
They include the ESP dummy variables, which reflect the partial
derivative of the change in wages and prices with respect to the ac-
tions of the Economic Stabilization Program. The coefficients are
only a measure of the direct impact of controls,, since the equations
are not allowed to interact. Controls resulted in a significant 1.17
percentage point annual reduction in wages in the manufacturing
sector of Phase III. The impact on manufacturing prices also was
negative (an annual percentage point decrease of 0.074), but not
significantly different from zero. Phase II and Freeze I exerted a
positive pressure on wages and prices, which is consistent with the
industry results. On the other hand, the significant downward im-
pact on wages in Phase III contradicts our previous results for the
disaggregated industries. However, the disaggregated equation did
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g- inconsistency.
is Because they do not include the interaction of wages and prices,
ie the dummy variable coefficients fail to measure the total impact of
es controls. The total impact can be measured by simulating the re-
estimated wage and price equations (2 and 4). It has been indicated
that the model used to simulate an economy without controls
produced a bias in the predicted value of wages and prices because
er of the errors generated in each of the discrete simulations. To meas-
ure the total impact of controls by comparing the simulated values
for an economy without controls against the actual values for an
economy with controls would result in an error because of the
presence of bias in the simulated series. A more consistent measure
of the total impact of controls is to compare two simulated series of
wages and prices. It may then be assumed that simulation bias is
present in both models and, hence, that the total impact would be
y net of any simulation bias. Therefore, the total impact is measured
n by comparing the simulated values for an economy without controls
1- againstthe simulated values for an economy with controls. These
)r simulated values appear in Table 9.
If the mechanism generating wages and prices had operated as it
did prior to the establishment of the control program, then the
i- equations for an economy without controls would provide predic-
tions of wages and prices. However, if the control program had any
influence on the determination of wages and prices, then the equa-
)f TABLE 9 Comparison of Simulated Values of Wage
e (WF) and Price (PQF) Equations for an








WF, PQF1 WF, PQF,
1971111 7.48 3.85 8.02 3.87
IV 7.55 4.61 8.06 4.54
19721 7.35 5.48 7.81 5.32
II 7.39 5.91 7.91 5.67
III 7.84 6.22 8.16 5.87
IV 8.51 6.36 8.74 5.89
19731 9.04 7.08 7.96 5.74
II 9.48 8.73 8.19 7.21
SiniuIationsbegin in 1971111.
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appropriate predictions for an economy with controls. The differ-
ences in these two simulationswould reflect the total impact of the
control program. It appears that the control program raised manu-
facturing wages by 0.03 percentage points on an annual basis and
lowered prices by 0.52 percentage points on an annual average, APP
abovewhat would have occurred in the absence of controls.
On the whole, it can generally be concluded that the aggregate
A
wageand price relations fail to agree with the results presented for
the disaggregated two-digit industries. The poor performance of
the model in the historical period and the inability of the wage
equation to track the wage inflation of the mid-1960s result in an
underprediction of wage change. The lower-than-normal wage
values then interact in the price equations and result in an under-
prediction of prices. Thus, the aggregate equations probably yield
erroneous estimates of the impact of controls. Second, the apparent
contradiction between the industry and aggregate models leaves
us somewhat apprehensive about the worth of any macroeconomic
relation. The method of data aggregation and poor selection of a
model could be causes of some of the disagreement, but a problem
of equal importance may be in the inappropriateness of aggregate
wage and price equations for the manufacturing sector.29 This sug-
gests that relationships should not be estimated at such a high level
of aggregation.
VII.SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Ourtentative conclusion is that the industry equations are more
meaningful than the aggregate ones. Hence, the Economic Stabili-
zation Program had little impact on the manufacturing sector of the
economy. The conclusion is labeled tentative because there are
several shortcomings in the analytical system and in the two-digit
manufacturing data that underlie the simulation results. The
models used are somewhat imprecise and limited by the choice of
variables in testing various hypotheses relating to price and wage
determinations: Simultaneous models for individual manufacturing
industries were not constructed, and consequently the total impact
of controls could not be ascertained. An attempt was made to esti-
mate the total impact at the aggregate manufacturing level, but the
experiment was less than satisfactory. Finally, like mostresearchers
in the field, we were limited in our ability to measure structural
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comings in the use of dummy variables.
APPENDIX:SOURCES OF DATA
Allmonthly series were transformed into quarterly ones by averag-
ing their values for the three months of each quarter, except ship-
ments, S, for which the sum of the monthly values was used.
In tables 1 through 6, the F suffix on a variable indicates that the
figures used for the series are for the change between the current
quarter and the same quarter a year ago as a percentage of the cur-
rent quarter: for any series X, the variable XF1 is equal to (X —
X_4.Unless stated otherwise each data source is industry-specific.
The suffix FWA indicates that the variable is defined as a four-
quarter weighted average of the F series just described: for any
series X, the variable XFWA is defined as 0.4 XF +0.3XF1_1
+0.2XF_2 +0.1XF_3, where XF is defined as above.
BLS =U.S.Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics;
BEA =U.S.Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis;
NIPA =nationalincome and product accounts of the United
States;
Census =U.S.Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census;
FRB =Boardof Governors of the Federal Reserve System;
SIC =StandardIndustrial Classification.
PQ =indexof nonseasonally adjusted output prices for two-digit
SIC. The correspondence between the monthly elements of the
BLS nonseasonally adjusted wholesale price index (WPI) and the
three- and four-digit SICs was established at the four-digit level.
These WPIs were then aggregated to the input-output classifica-
tions of the 1958 input-output table published in Survey of Current
Business, weighting by shipments of the corresponding SIC cate-
gory in 1958. The quarterly series was constructed as a simple
average of the monthly series.
=FRBquarterly series for industrial production for two-digit
SIC.
DlNS =inventory-to-salesratio for two-digit SIC. Inventories
are the BEA adjusted inventory valuation in billions of current
dollars. Sales for two-digit SIC are the BEA seasonally adjusted
monthly series on sales in billions of current dollars.
W =BLSseasonally adjusted monthly index of average hourly
StabilizationEffects on Wages, Prices, and Profit Margins 283earnings of production workers, adjusted to exclude overtime for
two-digit SIC.
PIQ1 =indexof nonseasonally adjusted input prices for two-digit
SIC. Input prices are constructed from the output price indexes by
using input-output coefficients as weights. The input price for an
industry is the weighted average of output prices, where the
weights are the direct input requirements as given in the 1958
input-output table. Allowances are made for intraindustry pur-
chases of inputs and for the purchase of important materials from
outside manufacturing.
BAA1= Moody'syield on Aaa corporate bonds.
SPD1 =specialdummy variable equal to 1.0 in 1970 and 2.0 in
1971, to account for unusual profits in 1970 and 1971.
PR1 =BLSnonseasonally adjusted monthly index of consumer
prices for all items, with base of 1.0 in 1967.
EM1 =BLSnonseasonally adjusted employment of production
workers for two-digit SIC.
QM1 =BLSseasonally adjusted quarterly index of output per
man-hour for two-digit SIC with base of 1.0 in 1967.
u1 =BLSseasonally adjusted unemployment rate for all civilian
workers.
L1 =BLSseasonally adjusted layoff rate for all manufacturing,
per 100 employees.
GPD1 =mid-1960swage-price guidepost dummy variable con-
structed to equal 0.25 in 19621 and 196711, 0.50 in 196211 and
196711, 0.75 in 1962111 and 19671, 1.0 from 19621V through 19661V,
and zero in all other quarters.
ESP11 =ninety-daywage-price freeze, Phase II, and Phase III
dummy variable.
ESP21 =ninety-daywage-price freeze and Phase II dummy
variable.
ESP31 =PhaseIII dummy variable.
PM1 =quarterlyseries on profit margins for two-digit SIC. Ratio
of NIPA pretax profits to BEA sales for two-digit SIC.
NOTES
1.Whether a firm is a near-perfect competitor, a monopolistic competitor, an
oligopolist, or a pure monopolist, the output-price decisions of the firm de-
pend upon the demand schedule as pictured by the fimi after any and all al-
lowances for the actions of others. Thus, we are assuming, for purposes of
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—--r determining the effect on the planning function of the firm, that the regula-
tions of the various phases did not affect the demand schedule for the firm.
t 2.The major exemptions from the freeze were raw, unprocessed products and
imports. For further details see Economic Report of the President (1972) and
Weber (1973).
3.Among the more notable were the ones announced by the major steel firms.
Following the signing of a new labor contract effective August 8, 1971, which
contained average first-year wage increases of about 15 percent, prices were
raised on some product lines and announced for the others. These scheduled
price increases averaged 8 percent.
4.Under the term limit pricing (TLP) arrangement enacted by the Price Com-
mission in late 1971, Tier I firms were given the option of applying for a
weighted average price increase covering all or most product lines for a period
of one year without specific commission approval of changes in individual
product prices. The weighted average price increase was initially set at 2 per-
r cent, but was reduced to 1.8 percent in the spring of 1972. TLP was designed
to give flexibility to the price control program and to relieve the limited staff
of the commission from processing and approving thousands of individual
price requests by large firms with complex product lines. In order to make
certain that firms taking advantage of the TLP arrangement would not commit
r flagrant violations of the rules, they were required to keep records and file
quarterly reports. They were also supposed to establish a monitoring pro-
cedure that would assure reasonable compliance with the allowable weighted
average price increase.
5.From November 15, 1971, to December 31, 1971, the waiting period was only
seventy-two hours. Details are presented in Lanzillotti, Hamilton, and Roberts
(1975).
6."Base price" is the price that existed during the freeze. The "base period" is
the best two out of the last three fiscal years. "Profit margin" is pretax profits,
before extraordinary income, as a percent of sales. See Economic Stabilization
(1972).
7.If prices are allowed to increase by the amount of the increase in unit pro-
duction costs, then profit margins are identical before and after the price in-
crease. This is only true for a single-product firm.
8.For the profit-maximizing firm, either marginal cost (MC) equals marginal
revenue (MR) and the constraint is unbinding, or the profit margin (M) is
binding and MC =MR.In the following proof, P =price,1' =output,PY =
valueof output, and C(Y) =costs,where costs are a function of output:
Max: PY —C(Y)
PY—C(Y) subject to M= a constant
implies that for the Lagrangian:
L =PY—C(Y)+A[MPY —PY+C(Y)]
+AI(M_1)!')+l Y ifY o1' L Y OY J '
=(M—1)PY+C(Y)O; 0
Thus, if A> 0; [PY —C(Y)]/PY=M. If Y >0,A0; then O(PY)1t3(Y) =8CIÔY.
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LL
______9.To show this, let C =CoY,a), where a0 and OCIOa= 1.If expenditures are
purely wasteful the 8(PY)Iôa =0.Thus the Lagrangian is
L =PY—C(Y,a) +X[MPY—PY+CoY,a)]
and the first-order conditions are:
i9L
—.w_ oy oYI a: ôYj'o
OL 8C .9C ÔL —= —— + A— 0;—a =0
ôa Oa &r ôa
=(M—1)P1' +C(Y,a)0; --A =0
Therefore, if 1' >0and A =0,it must be that a =0and t)(PY)/OY =ÔCIoY.
However, y >0,and a >0;then A= 1or (P1' —C)/PY=Mand ö(PY)/OY =0.
10.Formally, add R(a) to the constrained optimization problem in note 9, where
1 >(äRIôa)>0and t9C/ôa =1.The Lagrangian and first-order conditions are:
L=PY+R(a)—C(Y,a)+X(MPY—PY+C)




Thus, if 1'> 0 and A =0,then O(PY)/äY =OC/ÔYand a =0,since aR/Oa <
i3CI&a.If 1' >0and a >0, then from (b), A> 1 —ÔR/ôa>0. From (a),if
aC/a)' >&(PY)/t9Y,then A> 1; thus OC/ÔY >ô(PY)/ÔY>0 at the optimum.
11.Letting P be the desired price for target rate-of-return pricing; P. the allowable
price under the regulations; 1'), profits at P; and M, the profit margin at normal
output with pri'ce P; then dPI!'dPIP as
v,v1' <MY
where v1 is the price of the ith factor of x1,f =v,x,/C, andf,=the fraction that
fixed costs (K) ase to total costs. The proof is as follows: at Y, py =iv,,+11,
and=111K,whereis the normal rate of return. Thus dl' =0implies dfl =0
(do,d1,dY\ d_f\+—yj
Y
The allowable percentage increase in price is
dP—(dvi+dx,—dY'\—dl' P1'\--?7f1--
Thus, dPIPdPIP implies that
(dv,dx,dY'>ffdY 1\.i +- T) - W
286 Al-Samarrie, Kraft, and Robertsr . Therelaxation in the profit margin limitation raised from three to five the num-
ber of fiscal years from which firms could select the two years they would con-
sider most advantageous in calculating their profit margin base. Moreover, a
firm would no longer be constrained by the profit margin rule if its weighted
average price increase was not in excess of 1.5 percent a year.
13.Other alternative proxies for labor market tightness are quit rates, layoff rates,
unemployment dispersion, or excess labor reserves.
14.The expectation hypothesis can consist of a distributed lag of past price
changes (Turnovsky 1972a), actual expectations price data (Tumovsky 1972b),
or a nonlinear inflation severity variable (Eckstein and Brinner 1972).
15.Recent analysis of wage determination stems from the work of A. W. Phillips
(1958), who related wage changes to the unemployment rate, a proxy for labor
market tightness. Modifications have taken several directions. For example,
Eckstein and Wilson (1962), Hammermesh (1972), Ashenfelter, Johnson, and
Pencavel (1972), Wachter (1970a, 1974), and Okun (1973) have included effects
of unions on the relative wage structure, termed "the spillover thesis" or the
"relative wage distortion thesis." Kaldor has long considered profits as a causal
variable in wage rate determination, based on his theories of economic growth.
Thus, Kaldor (1959) argued that Phillips's results probably arose from a correla-
tion between unemployment rates and profits. Among those who have tested
the high profits-wages thesis are Levinson (1960), Bhatia (1962), Eckstein and
Wilson (1962), Perry (1966), and Perry et al. (1969). Kuh (1967) argued that
profits in econometric wage equations were only a surrogate for a more funda-
mental determinant of wages: productivity. While this may be true at the ag-
gregate level, it need not be so at the industry level. At the aggregate level, if
we divide national income into profits and labor income, then by. definition
the percent change in wages is equal to the percent change in prices plus the
f percent change in output per man-hour plus the percent change in the output-
capital ratio multiplied by the ratio of profits to labor income. Consequently,
if the output-capital ratio is constant or changing at a constant rate, K, then
%w =K+ %p + %(YIL), where to= wages,p =prices,and Y/L =output
per man-hour. - -
16.This particular weighting of the lag variables is adopted from Eckstein and
Brinner (1972). Also, the imposed weighted lags tend to smooth out impacts
which produce a dampening of large fluctuations in predicted wages and
prices.
17.We are grateful to David Wyss for providing us with the original work
sheets, which were helpful in constructing the output and input series.
Because of adjustments these are different from those of Eckstein and Wyss
(1972),
18.In previous wage and price studies in which simultaneous-equation tech-
niques were used, it was found that the bias associated with reliance on
ordinary least squares is quite small in wage and price equations. See Dicks-
Mireaux 1961), Eckstein and Brinner (1972), Goldstein (1972), and Rappoport
and Kniesner (1974).
19.However, the Durbin-Watson statistics imply autocorrelation due to the
presence of an omitted explanatory variable. For a discussion of thisin
terms of consistency of the estimated coefficients, see McCallum (1973).
20.For a discussion of the impact of cost-of-living adjustments in the periods
prior to and during controls, see Stallard and Solnick (1974).
21.There have been various conceptual objections to using the aggregate un€rn-
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J_. -ployment rate as a proxy for labor market tightness. Both Gordon (1971) and
Perry (1970) have developed alternative measures of labor market tightness
Both measures were tested in the wage equations, and they performed less
9 well than the aggregate measures. It is doubtful that industry-specific meas-
ures would perform any better, except in industries with high unemploy.
ment and weak labor unions.
22.This particular weighting of the dummy variable is adopted from Eckstein and
Brinner (1972) and reflects the relative strength of the guidepost policies over
the period of estimation.
23.For the use of ESP1 to determine the direct impact of controls, see Gordon
(1972). Explanations of the wage and price impacts of the freeze and Phase
d IIare discussed in Askin (n.d.), Bosworth (1972), and Poole (1973). For a dis-
cussion of the aaequacy of guidepost dummies, see Perry (1967) and Perry
et al. (1969). For a more general discussion of the dummy variable technique
see Askin and Kraft (1973) and Rees (1971).
24.Methods of computing the total impact of wage and price controls are elab-
orated in Askin and Kraft (1973) and Gordon (1972).
25.The four-quarter percent change in the unemployment rate, the manufactur-
ing layoff rate, and the unemployment rate for manufacturing were also tried
separately and in combination, but all were inferior proxies for labor market
tightness.
26.We use a second-degree polynomial lag with the coefficient constrained to
zero in the last period. The linking equation presents the sum of the lag co-
eflicients on PQF, where the t statistic is computed from the standard error
of the sum.
27.The model trackings for 1959111—197111 are available on application to the
authors.
28.The approximation is crude, since we would be comparing a simulated value
with a fixed actual value. Under this comparison, the difference could reflect
both controls and any simulated error and thus could be an overstatement,
depending on whether the simulations underpredict or overpredict wages
and prices.
29.While we presented only one macromodel in the paper, we tested and simu-
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and Columbia University
Thegeneral purpose of this study is appealing—to estimate the
effects of the price and wage controls from disaggregated industiy
data. Equations are fitted to the precontrols period and then applied
to the controls period to determine their residual effect. We can
thus estimate the effect on the rate of change of prices and wages
during the controls period and the cumulative effect. The cumula-
tive effect is especially pertinent when controls begin with a
freeze, because of postfreeze catching up. It might also be desirable
to measure the cumulative effect beginning a little before and end-
ing a little after, to catch precontrol anticipatory increases and post-
control catching up, though this was not done (since not all the data
were yet available for the catch-up period). The total effect is im-
portant, since controls are likely to redistribute price increases over
time but have little lasting effect on the price level.
The authors take aggregate demand as given, of course, and do
not go into the important policy issue of whether the imposition of
controls changed policy, perhaps leading policymakers to be overly
expansionary, as I think did happen in 1972. The price and wage
equations cannot answer that question, and we cannot expect them
to. I mention this only to remind us that in discussing the technical
problems of these equations, we are not answering all the questions
raised by controls.
While we are busily engaged in estimating the effect of controls,
I keep wondering what effect we are testing for. For a given set of
aggregate demand policies, there is a path of prices and wages
which the economy tends to follow. What can controls do? They
might suppress increases by holding real wages and profit margins
down, in which case there will be large catching-up increases after-
ward, but no lasting departure from the equilibrium path. Econ-
omists understand this, even if no one else does. To be sure, the
way in which controls are enforced can affect the degree of suppres-
sion, as the authors discuss in the first part of their paper, but such
effects are fluctuations around the equilibrium path, not changes in
the path itself. The important question is, Can the equilibrium path
be changed?
StabilizationEffects on Wages, Prices, and Profit Margins 291For a given aggregate-demand policy, the answer has to be no,
but the hope is that suppression will make the imposition of greater
monetary and fiscal restraint easier to bear by allowing higher out-
put and lower prices than would otherwise occur. I see little pos-
sibility of achieving this by holding down profit margins through
suppress ion of price increases; the effect on output and employ-
ment is likely to be adverse. The argument in the paper that a freeze
puts a kink in the demand curve of oligopolies, with the result that
changes in marginal cost are unlikely to cause a change in output,
may be correct for the short run, but it overlooks the effect on incen-
fives to invest in greater capacity, which can create supply limita-
tions later on.
A lasting benefit from controls depends upon a suppression of
wage increases by preventing either anticipatory increases to future
inflation or a catching up to past inflation. This probably works be-
cause labor supply does not appear to be reduced, at least in the
short run, by a reduction in real wages that comes about through
a failure of money wages to rise as fast as the cost of living; at the
same time, on the demand side the reduction in real wages stimu-
lates hiring. The crux of the control program lies in the wage
effects; the price controls are a smoke screen. Therefore, I do not
understand the authors' concluding remarks, which are addressed
to improving the enforcement of price controls. They are silent on
the benefits to be achieved. I can only surmise that they see con-
trols as preventing cost-push price increases. However, I did not
think anyone thought that inflation in recent years was a genuine
cost-push. Perhaps I am wrong about prevailing opinion; in any
event, it seems to me that the evidence is all against the cost-push
interpretation.
The three phases of controls do not appear to have produced any
lasting benefit because most of the effect is estimated to have been
on prices, with little on wages. That is the indication of casual ob-
servation of wages and profit margins and of Gordon's econometric
analysis.' The results of this study, though mixed, do not contradict
that conclusion. These are the same as Nadiri's results presented at
this conference for phases I and II, though he inexplicably obtains
a strong effect for Phase III, which from all appearances was weak.
Looking more closely at the details of the estimates in the paper,
we note that the individual equations of price changes are for
seventeen industries. The explanatory variables tested were the
change in the indexes for wages and for materials price, the change
in deficient demand as measured by an inventory-sales ratio (rather
than measuring the change in the ratio, deficient demand should be
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haps the change approximates such deviations), the change in out-
put to catch changes in productivity as firms move along their aver-
age cost curve, the change in a rate of return to the firm to catch the
effect of target-return pricing, and the change in a bond yield to
reflect the cost of capital. Variables were dropped if, before correc-
tion for serial correlation, they were statistically insignificant. How-
ever, those which became insignificant after correction for serial
correlation were retained. In the results, the rate-of-return variable
was dropped from all the equations; and the bond rate, from all but
one. None of the equations has the same set of variables, though
most have wages and input prices, and about half have either the
variable for output or for deficient demand or both. Still, deficient
demand, which should be important in the more competitive indus-
tries (though itisstrangely important for certain industries in some
studies and not in others), is significant and negative only for the
competitive lumber industry and the fairly concentrated nonferrous
metals industry. The problem of not having significant demand
variables in the equations is brought out by imagining that controls
operated perfectly to reduce the rate of change of all prices and
wages in the economy. Theoretically, the reduction in price change
would be matched in the equations by the reduction in wage and
input price changes. Then, without any demand variable, the
residuals of the equation would not indicate that controls had any
effect!
Most aggregate studies take explicit account of labor produc-
tivity by including unit labor cost, not just wages, in the price equa-
tion. In this and the Eckstein-Wyss study,2 productivity is assumed
to grow at a constant rate and to be incorporated in the constant
term. I am perturbed over this difference between the aggregate
and disaggregate studies. I am not sure which is correct. However,
itisinadequate to assume that productivity and wage changes are
correlated in the short run and that the wage coefficient can repre-
sent their combined effect, as the authors seem to imply in their
statement at the end of section IV,onwage results, in their effort
to make sense of a negative wage coefficient.
Aside from a quarrel here and there over details, I have no objec-
tion to the general design of their equations, but I am uneasy with
the results here and elsewhere based on time series. My main con-
cern is with the fixed lags implicit in these regression equations.
My casual inspection of the time series indicates that lags vary from
one episode to the next as well as among industries. I am not sure
the short time periods of this study avoid the problem. The use of
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smooth out very much of the differences in lag times. At the mo-
rnent, traditionaltechniques use fixed lags, and I have no alterna-
tive to recommend, but they can be a sourceof major difficulty.
Even aside from lags, the dangers of spurious results are high
because of common cyclical movements in these variables. The
regressions cover the long upward movement in rates of change
over the 1960sand contain four or five explanatory variables; they
are ripe for spuriouscorrelation. My uneasiness is heightened by
the lack of robustness of the results, which differ greatly between
the aggregate and disaggregate studies and between small changes
in the period of coverage and in specification. If we compare the
same sixteenindustries covered in the Eckstein-Wyss study for a
slightly earlier period, and look just at the common wage and input
price variables, the large differences in significance and magnitude
of estimates are alarming. Ignoring the size of the coefficients and
looking merely at how many of the coefficients agree only in sign
and significance, we find five out of sixteen for wages, though a
more favorable twelve out of sixteen for input prices (however,
even in the latter case, eleven of the industries do not have a sig-
nificant coefficientfor materials prices). To be sure, other variables
included in the equations of these two studies are different, but
why should their inclusion make so much difference for basic vari-
ables like wages and materials cost? Eckstein and Wyss made much
of their equations as showing price behavior consistent with a
classification of industries by concentration, based on the coeffi-
cients of the utilization and rate-of-return variables. Insofar as the
present study offers comparison, I see little agreement in classifica-
tion.
Let me turn now to Nadiri's results presented at this conference.
He regresses the variables in level form, not rate of change, but
allows for lagged adjustments and, in principle, estimates some of
the same parameters. Here again the differences are major. Nadiri
generally obtains more significant results, presumably because the
level form of his variables is likely to reflect longer-run total effects
than the first-difference form used here. In his price equation
Nadiri finds a significant wage variable in eight of his twelve indus-
tries, but there is less than 50 percent agreement between his study
and this one on significance for the eleven industries covered in
common, and the same is true for materials cost. For the wage equa-
tions, there is the same problem. By comparison with Nadiri, the
significance and sign of unemployment agree in only seven of
eleven industries and the significance and sign of lagged prices in
six of eleven.
294 Comments by CaganSo we are hardly yet in a position to say that we have reached a
consensus on the specification and general results of these industry
equations. I wish that these studies would duplicate the specifica-
tions of previous ones, so that we could distinguish among the dif-
ferences due to the periods covered, the data used, and the specifi-
cation, and so narrow down the glaring inconsistencies.
Aside from the lack of robustness, the coefficients often flop
around from positive to negative from one industry to another. The
authors try to cope with this by arguing that the variables are
proxies for different effects, which are relatively strong for some
industries and weak for others. For example, changes in output, if
positive, indicate changes in capacity utilization and reflect excess
demand pressures, but if they are negative, they are a proxy for
movements along a falling average cost curve. There may be no
simple solution to flip-flopping coefficients, but such multiproxy
variables are hardly ideal.
In addition, the size of the coefficients is extremely wide-ranging,
much more so than is the theoretical effect of the wage and input
price variables, which in percentages should have a long-mn effect
on prices equal to their respective shares in total costs in each in-
dustry. Moreover, those for materials cost are generally too low,
suggesting that a good part of the lagged effects is not being caught.
Materials costs range from 40 to 70 percent of total costs,3 but the
positive regression coefficients range from 8 to 67 percent. The
wage coefficients, on the other hand, tend to be muchtoo high.
For the purpose at hand—estimating the effect of controls—all
these deficiencies may not matter too much. The equations, even if
misspecified, may be adequate to show the residual effect of con-
trols. The results for the dummy variables inserted in the equations
to register the effect of controls indicate that only for tobacco did
phases I and II have downward effects on price changes that were
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. For Phase III, there is
a significant result for apparel only. A few other results were sta-
tistically significant at the 10 percent level. In several industries
the dummies used had. significantly positive effects; however this
is exp1aiied, it gives no support to the effectiveness of controls.
Furthermore, a completely different set of industries showed sig-
nificant effects of controls on profit margins. If controls suppressed
prices, it is hard to see why they would not also reduce profit
margins in the same industries.
What about wages, which I argued above are the crux of the con-
trol program? The wage equations, which do show a significant
effect of the mild guideposts in the early 1960s in nine industries,
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any of the seventeen industries, and show significantly positive
effects in four industries! The aggregate effect, using BLS weights
for wholesale prices in December 972 and excluding instruments
(SIC 38), is +0.6 percent. This result is hard to swallow, even for
someone unsympathetic to the usefulness of controls like me. I'd
bet my hat that the controi dummies are reflecting catching-up
wage increases here, and the problem lies in the use of concurrent
values (or, at most, values lagged one quarter) of the cost of living,
which imposes too fast an adjustment on its effect.
Rightly skeptical regarding these results, the authors have pre-
sented other tests based on aggregate equations. Theirs are much
simpler than Gordon's or Nadiri's, for they use only wages and
input prices in the price equation and prices, unemployment, and
output per man-hour in the wage equation. The control dummies
are generally not significant; the only significant one is for wages
in Phase III. The interaction effect of combining the price and
wage equations, presented in the final table of the paper, shows a
zero overall effect on wages, though a positive effect in phases I
and II and a negative one in Phase III. I think the sequence is
wrong (Phase II was tougher than III), but the overall zero effect
seems to me about right. Nadiri's results for aggregate equations in
his Table 9 for total manufacturing are not dissimilar for wages,
being generally positive in phases I and II and negative only in
III. As I argued before, if the effect of controls was all on prices
and not on wages, as suggested by these results, it was not lasting.
Let me end with the obvious point we all know but usually leave
unsaid: that the data for two-digit industries are probably not accu-
rate enough to reveal the small effects we are looking for. There is
cons iderable mismatching of prices with other variables at the two-
digit level, and we may have to disaggregate further. Certainly no
one can say that a reason for not doing so is that the results with
more aggregate data have been so satisfactory.
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4.These results suffer also, I believe, from a concurrent price variable.
Nadiri has an inexplicable positive effect for manuflicturing prices, which
turns into the correct negative effect for the equation pertaining to the total
ecoromy. But what sectors outside of manufacturing were strongly affected by
controls?
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